Then, the venerable Śāradvatī­putra asked the Blessed One, “Reverend Lord! When you say that great bodhisattva beings who continue to engage in union with the transcendent perfection of wisdom deserve respect, then, Reverend Lord, what constitutes that phenomenon designated by the term ‘bodhisattva,’ that is to say, the one who at all times continues to engage inseparably in union with the transcendent perfection of wisdom? If one were to ask why, it is because I do not consider any phenomenon that may be designated by the term ‘bodhisattva.’”

The Blessed One addressed the venerable Śāradvatī­putra as follows: “Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that physical forms constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!” he replied.

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the eyes constitute a bodhisattva, and similarly, do you think that the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that sights constitute a bodhisattva, and similarly, do you think that sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the sensory element of the ears, the sensory element of sounds, and the sensory element of auditory consciousness constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the sensory element of the nose, the sensory element of odors, and the sensory element of olfactory consciousness constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the sensory element of the tongue, the sensory element of tastes, and the sensory element of gustatory consciousness constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the sensory element of the body, the sensory element of tangibles, and the sensory element of tactile consciousness constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the sensory element of the mental faculty, the sensory element of mental phenomena, and the sensory element of mental consciousness constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the earth element constitutes a bodhisattva, and similarly, do you think that the water element, the fire element, the wind element, the space element, and the consciousness element constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that fundamental ignorance constitutes a bodhisattva, and in the same vein, do you think that [other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that anything other than physical forms constitutes a bodhisattva, and similarly, do you think that anything other than feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that anything other than the eyes constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Similarly, do you think that anything other than the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that anything other than sights constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Similarly, do you think that anything other than sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that anything other than the sensory element of the eyes constitutes a bodhisattva, and in the same vein, do you think that anything other than [the other sensory elements], up to and including the sensory element of the mental faculty, constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that anything other than the earth element constitutes a bodhisattva, and similarly, do you think that anything other than the water element, the fire element, the wind element, the space element, and the consciousness element constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that anything other than fundamental ignorance constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra! In the same vein, do you think that anything other than [the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the real nature of physical forms constitutes a bodhisattva, and similarly, do you think that the real nature of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the real nature of the eyes constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the real nature of the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the real nature of the sensory element of the eyes constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra! In the same vein, do you think that the real nature of [the other sensory elements], up to and including the real nature of the sensory element of mental consciousness, constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the real nature of fundamental ignorance constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra! In the same vein, do you think that the real nature of [the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that anything other than the real nature of physical forms constitutes a bodhisattva, and similarly, do you think that anything other than the real nature of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that anything other than the real nature of the eyes constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Similarly, do you think that anything other than the real nature of the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that anything other than the real nature of the sensory element of the eyes constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra! In the same vein, do you think that the anything other than the real nature of [the other sensory elements], up to and including anything other than the real nature of the sensory element of mental consciousness, constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that anything other than the real nature of fundamental ignorance constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra! In the same vein, do you think that anything other than the real nature of [the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!” he replied.

Then Blessed One asked, “Śāradvatī­putra, to what purpose have you said that physical forms do not constitute a bodhisattva, and in the same vein, that [all those other phenomena], up to and including the link of aging and death, do not constitute a bodhisattva? Why do you say that a bodhisattva is not anything other than physical forms, and that nor indeed does the real nature of physical forms constitute a bodhisattva, and in the same vein why do you say that nor does the real nature of [all those other phenomena], up to and including the link of aging and death, constitute a bodhisattva? Why do you say that a bodhisattva is not anything other than the real nature of physical forms, and in the same vein that a bodhisattva is not anything other than the real nature of [all those other phenomena], up to and including the link of aging and death?”

Then, the venerable Śāradvatī­putra asked the Blessed One, “Reverend Lord, if sentient beings are invariably unfound and not apprehended, how could they become bodhisattvas! How could physical forms become bodhisattvas! How could bodhisattvas become anything other than physical forms! In the same vein, how could [all the remaining phenomena] up to and including the link of aging and death, become bodhisattvas! How could bodhisattvas become anything other than [all those remaining phenomena], up to and including the link of aging and death! How could the real nature of physical forms become bodhisattvas! How could bodhisattvas become anything other than the real nature of physical forms! In the same vein, how could the real nature of [all those remaining phenomena], up to and including the link of aging and death, become bodhisattvas! How could bodhisattvas become anything other than the real nature of [those remaining phenomena], up to and including the link of aging and death! These would be impossible!”

The Blessed One replied, “Śāradvatī­putra, it is so! It is so! Śāradvatī­putra, since great bodhisattva beings apprehend no sentient beings, they should train in the transcendent perfection of non-referential wisdom.

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of physical forms constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!” he replied.

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of physical forms as permanent or impermanent constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness as permanent or impermanent constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of physical forms as happiness or suffering constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness as happiness or suffering constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of physical forms as a self or not a self constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness as a self or not a self constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of physical forms as empty or not empty constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness as empty or not empty constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of physical forms as with signs or signless constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness as with signs or signless constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of physical forms as having aspirations or lacking aspirations constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness as having aspirations or lacking aspirations constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of physical forms as calm or not calm constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness as calm or not calm constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of physical forms as void or not void constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness as void or not void constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of physical forms as afflicted or purified constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness as afflicted or purified constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of physical forms as arising or ceasing constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness as arising or ceasing constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of physical forms as entities or non-entities constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness as entities or non-entities constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of the eyes constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of the eyes as permanent or impermanent constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty as permanent or impermanent constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of eyes as imbued with happiness or suffering constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty as imbued with happiness or suffering constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of the eyes as a self or not a self constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty as a self or not a self constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of the eyes as empty or not empty constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty as empty or not empty constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of the eyes as with signs or signless constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty as with signs or signless constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of the eyes as having aspirations or lacking aspirations constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty as having aspirations or lacking aspirations constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of the eyes as calm or not calm constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty as calm or not calm constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of the eyes as void or not void constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty as void or not void constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of the eyes as afflicted or purified constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty as afflicted or purified constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra! Do you think that the designation of the eyes as arising or ceasing constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty as arising or ceasing constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of the eyes as entities or non-entities constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty as entities or non-entities constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of sights constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of sights as permanent or impermanent constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena as permanent or impermanent constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of sights as imbued with happiness or suffering constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena as imbued with happiness or suffering constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of sights as a self or not a self constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena as a self or not a self constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of sights as empty or not empty constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena as empty or not empty constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of sights as with signs or signless constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena as with signs or signless constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of sights as having aspirations or lacking aspirations constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena as having aspirations or lacking aspirations constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of sights as calm or not calm constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena as calm or not calm constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of sights as void or not void constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena as void or not void constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of sights as afflicted or purified constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena as afflicted or purified constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of sights as arising or ceasing constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena as arising or ceasing constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of sights as entities or non-entities constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena as entities or non-entities constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designation of the sensory element of the eyes constitutes a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“In the same vein, do you think that the designations [of all the remaining sensory elements], up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness as permanent or impermanent constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“In the same vein, do you think that the designations [of all the remaining sensory elements], up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness as permanent or impermanent, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of [all the sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness, and continuing in the same vein as far as [the designation of] the sensory element of mental consciousness, as imbued with happiness or suffering, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that that the designations of [all the sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness, and continuing in the same vein as far as [the designation of] the sensory element of mental consciousness, as a self or not a self, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of [all the sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness, and continuing in the same vein as far as [the designation of] the sensory element of mental consciousness, as empty or not empty, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of [all the sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness, and continuing in the same vein as far as [the designation of] the sensory element of mental consciousness, as with signs or signless, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of [all the sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness, and continuing in the same vein as far as [the designation of] the sensory element of mental consciousness, as having aspirations or lacking aspirations, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of [all the sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness, and continuing in the same vein as far as [the designation of] the sensory element of mental consciousness, as calm or not calm, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of [all the sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness, and continuing in the same vein as far as [the designation of] the sensory element of mental consciousness, as void or not void, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of [all the sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness, and continuing in the same vein as far as [the designation of] the sensory element of mental consciousness, as afflicted or purified, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of [all the sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness, and continuing in the same vein as far as [the designation of] the sensory element of mental consciousness, as arising or non-arising, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of [all the sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness, and continuing in the same vein as far as [the designation of] the sensory element of mental consciousness, as entities or non-entities, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of fundamental ignorance and, in the same vein, of [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of fundamental ignorance and, in the same vein, of [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, as permanent or impermanent, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of fundamental ignorance and, in the same vein, of [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, as imbued with happiness or suffering, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of fundamental ignorance and, in the same vein, of [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, as a self or a non-self, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of fundamental ignorance and, in the same vein, of [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, as empty or not empty, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of fundamental ignorance and, in the same vein, of [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, as with signs or signless, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of fundamental ignorance and, in the same vein, of [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, as having aspirations or lacking aspirations, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of fundamental ignorance and, in the same vein, of [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, as calm or not calm, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of fundamental ignorance and, in the same vein, of [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, as void or not void, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of fundamental ignorance and, in the same vein, of [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, as afflicted or purified, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of fundamental ignorance and, in the same vein, of [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, as arising or ceasing, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!”

“Śāradvatī­putra, do you think that the designations of fundamental ignorance and, in the same vein, of [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, as entities or non-entities, constitute a bodhisattva?”

“No, Reverend Lord!” he replied.

Then, the Blessed One addressed the venerable Śāradvatī­putra in the following words: “Śāradvatī­putra, why do you say that the designation of physical forms does not constitute a bodhisattva, and similarly, that the designations of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness do not constitute a bodhisattva? Why do you say that the designation of physical forms as permanent or impermanent does not constitute a bodhisattva? Similarly, why do you say that the designation of physical forms as imbued with happiness or suffering, their designation as a self or not a self, their designation as empty or not empty, their designation as with signs or signless, their designation as having aspirations or lacking aspirations, their designation as calm or not calm, their designation as void or not void, their designation as afflicted or purified, their designation as arising or ceasing, and their designation as entities or non-entities [do not constitute a bodhisattva]? In the same vein, why do you say that these same designations, made with respect to feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness, up to and including their designation as entities or non-entities, do not constitute a bodhisattva?

“In like manner, why do you say that the designation of the eyes does not constitute a bodhisattva, and similarly, that the designations of the ears, the nose, the tongue, the body, and the mental faculty do not constitute a bodhisattva? Likewise, why do you say that the designation of the eyes as permanent or impermanent does not constitute a bodhisattva, and similarly, that the designations of the ears, the nose, the tongue, the body, and the mental faculty as permanent or impermanent does not constitute a bodhisattva? In the same vein, why do you say that these [remaining] designations made with respect to the eyes, up to and including their designation as entities or non-entities, do not constitute a bodhisattva, and similarly, that these [remaining] designations made with respect to the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty, up to and including their designation as entities or non-entities, do not constitute a bodhisattva?

“In like manner, why do you say that the designation of sights does not constitute a bodhisattva, and similarly, that the designations of sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena do not constitute a bodhisattva? Why do you say that the designation of sights as permanent or impermanent does not constitute a bodhisattva, and similarly, that the designations of sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena as permanent or impermanent do not constitute a bodhisattva? In the same vein, why do you say that the [remaining] designations made with respect to sights, up to and including their designation as entities or non-entities, do not constitute a bodhisattva, and similarly, that the [remaining] designations made with respect to sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena, up to and including their designation as entities or non-entities, do not constitute a bodhisattva?

“Why do you say that the designation of the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness does not constitute a bodhisattva, and similarly, that the designations [of the remaining sensory elements], up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness, do not constitute a bodhisattva? Why do you say that the designation of the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness as permanent or impermanent, does not constitute a bodhisattva, and, in the same vein, that the designations of the [remaining] sensory elements, up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness, [as permanent or impermanent], do not constitute a bodhisattva? In the same vein, why do you say that the [remaining] designations made with respect to the sensory element of the eyes, the sensory element of sights, and the sensory element of visual consciousness, up to and including their designation as entities or non-entities, do not constitute a bodhisattva, and similarly, that the [remaining] designations made with respect to the [other] sensory elements, up to and including the designation of the sensory element of mental consciousness, as entities or non-entities, do not constitute a bodhisattva?

“Why do you say that the designation of fundamental ignorance does not constitute a bodhisattva, and in the same vein, that the designations [of the remaining links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death, do not constitute a bodhisattva? In like manner, why do you say that the designation of fundamental ignorance as permanent or impermanent does not constitute a bodhisattva, and, in the same vein, that the designations [of the other links of dependent origination], up to and including the link of aging and death, as permanent or impermanent, do not constitute a bodhisattva? In the same vein, why do you say that the [remaining] designations made with respect to fundamental ignorance, up to and including its designation as entity or non-entity, do not constitute a bodhisattva, and similarly, that [the remaining] designations made with respect to the [other links of dependent origination], up to and including the designation of aging and death, as entities or non-entities, do not constitute a bodhisattva?”

Then, the venerable Śāradvatī­putra replied to the Blessed One, “Reverend Lord, if physical forms are invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of physical forms become a bodhisattva? The same goes for feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of physical forms as permanent or impermanent is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of physical forms as such become a bodhisattva? The same goes for feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of physical forms as imbued with happiness or suffering is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of physical forms as such become a bodhisattva? The same goes for feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of physical forms as a self or not a self is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of physical forms as such become a bodhisattva? The same goes for feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of physical forms as empty or not empty is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of physical forms as such become a bodhisattva? The same goes for feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of physical forms as with signs or signless is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of physical forms as such become a bodhisattva? The same goes for feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of physical forms as having aspirations or lacking aspirations is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of physical forms as such become a bodhisattva? The same goes for feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of physical forms as calm or not calm is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of physical forms as such become a bodhisattva? The same goes for feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of physical forms as void or not void is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of physical forms as such become a bodhisattva? The same goes for feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of physical forms as afflicted or purified is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of physical forms as such become a bodhisattva? The same goes for feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of physical forms as arising or ceasing is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of physical forms as such become a bodhisattva? The same goes for feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of physical forms as entities or non-entities is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of physical forms as such become a bodhisattva? The same goes for feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the eyes are invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the eyes become a bodhisattva? The same goes for the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the eyes as permanent or impermanent is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the eyes as impermanent become a bodhisattva? The same goes for the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the eyes as imbued with happiness is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the eyes as imbued with suffering become a bodhisattva? The same goes for the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the eyes as a self is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the eyes as a non-self become a bodhisattva? The same goes for the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the eyes as empty is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the eyes as not empty become a bodhisattva? The same goes for the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the eyes as with signs is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the eyes as signless become a bodhisattva? The same goes for the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the eyes as having aspirations is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation [of the eyes] as lacking aspirations become a bodhisattva? The same goes for the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the eyes as calm is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the eyes as not calm become a bodhisattva? The same goes for the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the eyes as void is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the eyes as not void become a bodhisattva? The same goes for the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the eyes as afflicted is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the eyes as purified become a bodhisattva? The same goes for the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the eyes as arising is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the eyes as ceasing become a bodhisattva? The same goes for the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the eyes as entities is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the eyes as non-entities become a bodhisattva? The same goes for the ears, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty!

“Reverend Lord, if sights are invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of sights become a bodhisattva? The same goes for sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of sights as permanent is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of sights as impermanent become a bodhisattva? The same goes for sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of sights as imbued with happiness is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of sights as imbued with suffering become a bodhisattva? The same goes for sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of sights as a self is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of sights as a non-self become a bodhisattva? The same goes for sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of sights as empty is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of sights as not empty become a bodhisattva? The same goes for sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of sights as with signs is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of sights as signless become a bodhisattva? The same goes for sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of sights as having aspirations is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of sights as lacking aspirations become a bodhisattva? The same goes for sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of sights as calm is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of sights as not calm become a bodhisattva? The same goes for sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of sights as void is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of sights as not void become a bodhisattva? The same goes for sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of sights as afflicted is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of sights as purified become a bodhisattva? The same goes for sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of sights as arising is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of sights as ceasing become a bodhisattva? The same goes for sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of sights as entities is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of sights as non-entities become a bodhisattva? The same goes for sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena!

“Reverend Lord, if the sensory element of the eyes is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the sensory element of the eyes become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of sights and the sensory element of visual consciousness, up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the sensory element of the eyes as permanent is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the sensory element of the eyes as impermanent become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of sights and the sensory element of visual consciousness, up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the sensory element of the eyes as imbued with happiness is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the sensory element of the eyes as imbued with suffering become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of sights and the sensory element of visual consciousness, up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the sensory element of the eyes as a self is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the sensory element of the eyes as a non-self become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of sights and the sensory element of visual consciousness, up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the sensory element of the eyes as empty is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the sensory element of the eyes as not empty become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of sights and the sensory element of visual consciousness, up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the sensory element of the eyes as with signs is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the sensory element of the eyes as signless become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of sights and the sensory element of visual consciousness, up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the sensory element of the eyes as having aspirations is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the sensory element of the eyes as lacking aspirations become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of sights and the sensory element of visual consciousness, up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the sensory element of the eyes as calm is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the sensory element of the eyes as not calm become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of sights and the sensory element of visual consciousness, up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the sensory element of the eyes as void is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the sensory element of the eyes as not void become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of sights and the sensory element of visual consciousness, up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the sensory element of the eyes as afflicted is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the sensory element of the eyes as purified become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of sights and the sensory element of visual consciousness, up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the sensory element of the eyes as arising is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the sensory element of the eyes as ceasing become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of sights and the sensory element of visual consciousness, up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of the sensory element of the eyes as an entity is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of the sensory element of the eyes as a non-entity become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other sensory elements], starting from the sensory element of sights and the sensory element of visual consciousness, up to and including the sensory element of mental consciousness!

“Reverend Lord, if fundamental ignorance is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of fundamental ignorance become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of fundamental ignorance as permanent is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of fundamental ignorance as impermanent become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of fundamental ignorance as imbued with happiness is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of fundamental ignorance as imbued with suffering become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of fundamental ignorance as a self is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of fundamental ignorance as a non-self become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of fundamental ignorance as empty is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of fundamental ignorance as not empty become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of fundamental ignorance as with signs is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of fundamental ignorance as signless become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of fundamental ignorance as having aspirations is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of fundamental ignorance as lacking aspirations become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of fundamental ignorance as calm is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of fundamental ignorance as not calm become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of fundamental ignorance as void is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of fundamental ignorance as not void become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of fundamental ignorance as afflicted is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of fundamental ignorance as purified become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of fundamental ignorance as arising is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of fundamental ignorance as ceasing become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death!

“Reverend Lord, if the notion of fundamental ignorance as an entity is invariably non-apprehensible, how could the designation of fundamental ignorance as a non-entity become a bodhisattva? The same applies to [all the other links of dependent origination], up to and including aging and death! As indicated [above] in the context of the psycho-physical aggregates, the same refrain should be applied extensively to all [those other phenomenological categories].”

The Blessed One replied, “Śāradvatī­putra, it is so! It is so! Great bodhisattva beings who abide accordingly in this transcendent perfection of wisdom do not apprehend the designation of physical forms, and in the same vein, they do not apprehend [all the other designations concerning physical forms] up to and including the designation of physical forms as non-entities. Likewise, they do not apprehend the designations of feelings, perceptions, formative predispositions, and consciousness, and in the same vein, they do not apprehend [their further designations], starting from there and continuing up to the designation of consciousness as a non-entity. In the same vein, they do not apprehend the designation of fundamental ignorance, and they do not apprehend [the designations of the other links of dependent origination], up to and including the designation of aging and death. In the same vein, they do not apprehend the designation [of these links of dependent origination] as non-entities and so forth. As stated [above] in the context of the psycho-physical aggregates, the same refrain should also be applied extensively to all [those other phenomenological categories]. It is in this way that they should train in the transcendent perfection of wisdom.”